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Abstract 
For a nutrient trading system to achieve the desired environmental 
outcome, or goal, this outcome needs to be translated into nutrient flows and 
allowances. To connect the nutrient loss provided for under the allowances with 
the environmental goal, a number of decisions need to be made. These decisions 
will shape the nutrient trading system. This paper looks at the information and 
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1  Introduction—scope and linkages in paper 
This paper looks at the information and analysis needed to ultimately 
define ‘allowances’ and set trading caps for a nutrient trading system. In this 
paper, we deal with this in a deterministic way. Although there is uncertainty in 
many dimensions of the problem, we will act as though there is not and make a 
fixed decision based on the best information currently available. The issue of how 
to build a system that can create new information, incorporate new information as 
it is revealed, and handle irresolvable uncertainty will be dealt with in a future 
paper.  
We cannot directly observe the impacts of each landowner’s behaviour 
on lake quality. Thus we are always controlling monitorable proxies for these 
impacts. These proxies are related to our ultimate goal through models. What we 
put a cap on (lake inputs) is intrinsically linked to what we can monitor (property 
exports or proxies of these exports). Thus we need to address the problem of 
setting a trading cap from both ends: the water quality goal, and the technology 
for modelling nutrient loss and transport. This paper focuses on the former but 
identifies links to the latter. Two nutrients matter in Lake Rotorua, nitrogen (N) 
and phosphorus (P). We will discuss P first and then proceed with a focus on N, 
remembering that many of the same issues apply to both.  
Out of this discussion, we would like to provide preliminary decisions 
on several aspects of the nutrient trading system. In some cases, this could consist 
of several options and a short discussion of their relative merits.  
•  Which nutrients should be controlled under a trading cap? 
•  Should goals be defined in terms of nutrient loss (exports), nutrients 
entering the lake (inputs), or nutrient concentrations (stocks) in the 
lake? 
•  What do currently defined goals imply for trading caps? 
•  What periods of time and spatial zones should allowances apply to? 
1.1 Definitions—the  nutrient  chain 
We define the ‘goals’ as what society ultimately cares about. This goal 
is first defined in terms of qualitative factors that directly affect human activities 
(in Rotorua, “… water quality as it was in the 1960s before there was widespread 2 
concern about algal blooms …”). This goal is then translated into lake nutrient 
and chlorophyll concentrations and water clarity as an observable proxy for the 
expected goal (in Rotorua, a Trophic Lake Index, or TLI, value of 4.2). Of 
particular interest for a nutrient trading system is the translation of the water 
quality goal into nutrient inflows, or ‘inputs’, in each time period. Once the goal is 
expressed as nutrient inputs, ‘unmanageable’ nutrient inflows need to be 
estimated. These jointly define a ‘cap’ on manageable nutrient inflows into the 
lake.  
Some nutrient flows that are not created by human activity, and that are 
hence included in unmanageable flows, may be able to be influenced by treatment 
in the short-term or by investment in mitigation or diversion projects. These 
options could be included in the trading system by creating ‘offsets’ that are 
approved as allowances, thus increasing the cap.  
Because the mean residence time in the lake is very short, 1–2 years, we 
look at inputs only, rather than lake concentrations.
1 
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1 GNS Science talks about ‘mean residence times’. The model they use is a mixed model. Part of the water 
(somewhere around 50%) goes through as piston flow, in which case all the water has the same residence 
time. The other part goes into a mixed reservoir, and the MRT is exactly analogous to the half-life of a 
radioactive compound.  3 
Then, by defining the scope of the trading system and estimating the 
implied inflows that are outside the system, a ‘trading cap’ can be defined. This 
can be devolved to individual landowners2 and others who control nutrient flows 
and defined in terms of nutrient loss at the property level or ‘exports’. Parts of the 
Rotorua catchment are underlain by large aquifers with residence times of 15–100 
years. Nutrients may take many years to travel from the farms where they are 
generated to the springs that feed into the lake. This gives rise to ‘groundwater 
lags’ between changes in exports from the land and nutrient inputs to the lake. 
This paper focuses on defining the cap and converting a series of caps on inputs 
into caps on exports. A future paper will discuss the ‘scope’ of the system and 
hence the trading cap. 
1.2  Why use nutrient trading to achieve the cap? 
Scientists, regulators, and politicians have the best information on the 
nutrient impacts of land-use activities and management, and on public concerns 
about lake quality. Consultants may have useful information on the feasibility and 
profitability impacts of different land-use and management options. Landowners, 
however, are likely to have the best information on their own land and the 
profitability and costs of changes in their behaviour. If they don’t, they have 
incentives to get information if it is offered.  
Nutrient trading gives landowners the incentive to use their information, 
within the constraints of regulation, to achieve the goals set by regulators in the 
most efficient way possible. Nutrient trading may also be more acceptable to 
landowners than prescriptive regulation because it is less coercive and restrictive. 
It puts the focus of regulation on issues of public interest (the environmental 
outcome) rather than issues of private interest (e.g., on which properties nutrient 
losses occur).  
A nutrient trading system will encourage landowners to use nutrients in 
the most efficient way possible by aligning economic returns with environmental 
issues. This system will help the individuals understand the impact that their 
decisions are having on the lake water quality and may allow maximisation of 
                                                             
2 For simplicity in this paper, we refer to all individuals who participate in the nutrient trading as landowners. 4 
wealth creation through the flexible manner in which nutrient losses can be 
achieved.  
Nutrient trading is most useful where there are large numbers of 
heterogeneous agents (e.g., landowners) and where the actions required occur over 
long periods of time so that the information that agents hold is important. With a 
small number of agents, negotiation or modelling of decisions is more likely to get 
close to an efficient outcome. With large numbers of agents across a long time 
period, technical ‘experts’ and regulators are unlikely to be able to identify 
economically optimal sets of mitigation measures.  
If the nutrient cap is set and monitored in such a way that compliance 
with it ensures that the environmental goal is met, the regulatory system does not 
need to define how that cap is achieved. 
2  Are we targeting only nitrogen (N) or also 
phosphorus (P) in the nutrient trading 
programme?  
Both N and P are important in determining lake water quality in 
Rotorua. Although lake phytoplankton are currently limited by the supply of N in 
the short-term, the lake is nearly in balance in its demand for N and P. N load is 
increasing, whereas P load is almost static, so the lake could become P limited in 
the future. High P loads tend to favour undesirable N-fixing blue-greens. The 
scientific consensus is that both N and P need to be controlled (see Environment 
Bay of Plenty, 2004). Goals have been set for reductions in both N and P inputs. 
The key question is whether P should be controlled, at least in part, 
through the nutrient trading programme or whether it should be addressed 
separately, with some benefits from the trading programme flowing indirectly 
through actions aimed primarily at controlling N. 
The same on-farm measures control both N and P but with differences 
(sometimes significant) in performance. A number of ‘sound farming practices’ 
are advocated by AgResearch and included in the OVERSEER
® model. 
Environment Bay of Plenty (EBOP), in developing the Nitrogen Phosphorus Load 5 
Assessment System (NPLAS), has defined various P attenuation options (e.g., 
constructed wetlands). P and N may behave quite differently in the groundwater 
and may not have the same lags. The extra cost of monitoring P once N is 
monitored is low.  
Discussion at the Technical Advisory Group is about targeting N and P 
separately, although some approaches to reduction will address both 
simultaneously. This is probably the optimal approach. At this stage, we will 
proceed on the assumption that P will also be included in the trading system. 
3  Goals and caps  
This section first discusses what we are trying to control and how goals 
concerning water quality relate to caps that ultimately limit nutrient loss from 
individual properties at specific points in time. We then take this framework and 
link it to what has already been decided and what is already known in the Lake 
Rotorua catchment. 
3.1  Goals and caps in theory 
In this study group, we are not revisiting the issue of how to set 
appropriate water quality goals for Lake Rotorua. We are concerned only with 
how those goals are achieved. The current goal was set through a political process, 
with input from a combination of scientific and economic research on the benefits 
and costs of controlling nutrients. This is not a purely technical decision. It will 
need to be reassessed over time as more economic and scientific information 
becomes available and as social attitudes change.  
  A realistic series of goals 
For a trading programme, the goal has to be realistic and defined for 
specific time frames. Once the water-quality goal for the lake has been agreed, the 
nutrient inputs to achieve this goal (the input targets) are estimated and these 
become a series of caps on inputs. The caps will be achieved as long as the trading 
programme to manage exports is implemented—it is not a target that might be 
achieved. The water quality goal might or might not be achieved in any particular 
year (e.g., because of random variations in weather).  6 
What can be achieved in the short term is different from in the long 
term. This is partly because of the long lags of unmanageable groundwater flows 
coming into the lake. Also, the costs of change are higher if change is rapid. Costs 
will change over time with changes in the relative profitability of the different 
land uses and management practices. These costs will also be affected by the 
nutrient regulation put in place. It may be appropriate to have a gradual 
adjustment to the long term targets. The time series of input targets needs to be set 
via consultation between managers and stakeholders, with input on the science, 
economics, and social effects of possible alternatives.  
Figure 2 shows three scenarios that illustrate the challenges in setting 
realistic input targets to restore the lake. It illustrates the likely magnitude of 
unmanageable N inputs in the short and long run. The first graph shows a scenario 
where N exports from all manageable sources are instantly reduced to pre-
development levels (i.e., no people or human activity in catchment). Even in this 
extreme scenario, the target of 435 tonnes nitrogen per year (tN/y) is not reached 
for more than 50 years. The second simulation illustrates a more gradual reduction 
in exports, where input targets are not met for nearly 200 years. The third shows 
the effect of freezing exports at current levels. These scenarios illustrate the 
potential importance of mitigation and treatment of streams, lake water, and 









Figure 2  An illustration of how nutrient inputs to the lake may change over time for 
various management scenarios.  
  Top—steep reduction of exports in 2007 to 200 tN/y, the estimated pre-
development exports. Middle—phased reduction of exports from the current 746 tN/y to the 






















































































  The potential for ‘banking’ 
It may be that a political compromise is made to reduce short term 
costs. Goals are often less ambitious in the early years of a trading programme to 
get the system going. If goals are set in such a way that the environment would 
benefit from overachieving the goal in the early years, even if the more stringent 
goals  were offset by a looser goal in later years, a provision called ‘banking’ can 
be included in a trading programme. Allowances that were part of the cap in one 
period can be ‘banked’ and then withdrawn in a later period. These banked credits 
maintain their true value in terms of nutrients. This can lower the cost of the 
overall programme because relatively low-cost reductions are achieved early on 
while the cap is loose and, in exchange, high costs of compliance are avoided in 
later periods when the cap is very tight. Another potential advantage of banking in 
a ‘thin’ market (i.e., where there are few participants) is that landowners have 
more flexibility within their own properties if the market is not functioning 
smoothly. Banking also tends to smooth allowance prices over time. The cost of 
nutrient reductions (which determine the allowance price) tend to vary from year 
to year with commodity prices and weather. Banking allowances in low-cost years 
and withdrawing them in high-cost years smoothes the allowance price and 
reduces economic uncertainty.  
Banking that is driven by short term economic variation and that does 
not make the nutrient-loss path flatter (by banking when nutrient losses are high 
and withdrawing when they are lower) creates a trade-off between environmental 
certainty and management of economic risk.
3 Banking involves overachievement 
in some years and underachievement in others. The net environmental damage 
depends on how much lower the value of overachieving is relative to the damage 
from underachieving. This needs to be traded off against the net reductions in 
economic cost over the banking and withdrawing periods.  
 
                                                             
3 This is a common and well-studied issue in environmental regulation. The classic reference is 
Weitzman (1974). 9 
3.2  Goals and caps in practice for Lake Rotorua 
 Water  quality  goal 
The draft Action Plan (Joint Strategy Committee, 2007) sets the goal for 
Lake Rotorua’s water quality as the water quality in the mid-1960s. This translates 
to a Trophic Lake Index
4 (TLI) of 4.2. Currently, the TLI is 5.0. No time limit is 
set for achieving the goal. The goals in the Action Plan are set in terms of nutrient 
inputs.  
 Nutrient  goal 
Translating the water quality goal into nutrient inputs to the lake, the 
Action Plan adopts, as the long-term target, the estimated load in the mid-1960s 
(435 tN/y excluding internal loads, 30 tP/y excluding internal loads).  
Current exports from the catchment are around 746 tN/y and 40 tP/y 
(estimates from Morgenstern and Gordon, 2004). These are the inputs that would 
be expected to occur at ‘steady state’ (in ~200 years) if land use remained the 
same as it is at present and there were no attenuation (viz., nutrient loss in the 
groundwater or streams after nutrient has left the land). Current N inputs to the 
lake are lower than current exports from the catchment because of groundwater 
lags and possibly because of attenuation. Current inputs are around 547 tN/y and 
40 tP/y (Morgenstern estimates). The N inputs are expected to increase gradually 
over the next ~200 years as groundwater N concentrations slowly increase in 
response to historic land use changes. 
 Cap 
The Action Plan estimates the changes in N and P inputs expected to 
occur over the next ~200 years as a result of recent land use changes and 
groundwater lags (time delays in these nutrients reaching the lake). From these 
figures, estimates are made of the reductions in N and P inputs that are required to 
meet the load targets and hence the goals for lake water quality. 
                                                             
4 The TLI is an index calculated from measured total nitrogen, total phosphorus, chlorophyll concentrations, 
and water clarity. 10 
Table 1  Deriving a nitrogen input cap from the defined Lake Rotorua goals and 
planned actions—Step 1: define goal and planned reductions in inputs 
relative to status quo 
Required 
reductions in inputs 





Estimated N inputs 











2005 746–783  547  435  112  59
3   53
4 
2017 746–783  n.a.  435  250
5  59 191
6 
2055 746–783  659  435  224
5  59 165 
2105 746–783  699  435  264  59  205 
2205
7  746–783 746  435  311  59  252 
1 Independent
 estimates by Morgenstern (746 tN/y) and McIntosh (783 tN/y) are similar. 
2 Morgenstern estimates, Table 5.  
3 This figure comprises (1) upgrades to the PCP (15 tN/y), (2) sewerage of small communities (11 
tN/y), (3) urban storm water (3 tN/y), and (4) treatment of Tikitere (30 tN/y). Table 2 of the draft 
Action Plan. 
4 A further reduction of 53 tN/y is required to bring the current load of 547 tN/y down to the target 
of 435 tN/y. 
5 A reduction to inputs of 250 tN/y will accelerate improvements in lake water quality. 
6 The draft Action Plan aims for a 170 tN/y reduction in export from improved land-use 
management.  
7 The draft Action Plan gives these as the targets for 2050, but this may be a typo.  
 
Once N enters the groundwater, it is largely unmanageable.
5 In theory, 
N can be removed from groundwater, but in practice, this would be very 
expensive and is not being seriously considered in Rotorua. In theory, N and P can 
be removed from stream and spring water. Trials are being conducted using alum 
dosing to remove dissolved reactive phosphorus (DRP, or soluble phosphorus) 
from water in the Utuhina Stream. This is seen as a short-term measure to reduce 
P inputs while other input-reduction measures are put in place. There has been 
some general discussion about N removal from streams (e.g., wetlands, advanced 
treatment systems), but no detailed investigations are being conducted at present. 
The principal controls on N inputs are seen to be land-use change, on-farm 
mitigation measures (e.g., constructed wetlands and riparian buffers), and 
treatment/diversion of high load sources (e.g., sewerage, urban storm water, and 
the Hamurana Stream).  
Thus we can think of the lagged groundwater flows as unmanageable 
nutrient flows and the required reductions in N and P to meet the target inputs as 
defining the cap for the trading system. Other unmanageable sources include 
rainwater, waterfowl, and the baseline flows from exotic forestry (3 kg/ha/y), 
                                                             
5 There is a debate about the level of in-stream attenuation. 11 
which is the lowest export rate from any land use (see Table 6 in Appendix 1). We 
do not yet have good estimates of unmanageable groundwater flows for N. A 
current estimate of pre-development N inputs (all other unmanageable flows) is 
200 tN/y. Estimates of the pre-development P inputs have not yet been calculated, 
but these are likely to be similar to the current 30 tP/y as the majority of P inputs 
come from the rocks.  
The caps are a time series of manageable lake inputs that is agreed by a 
political process. In setting the caps, it will be necessary to:  
1.  agree a time series of total input targets within the community—as in 
Table 1 from the Action Plan—e.g., 435 tN/y, 30 tP/y 
2.  model nutrients already in groundwater in 2007 (start of programme) 
that will reach the lake in each given year and estimate unmanageable 
flows 
3.  subtract the unmanageable inputs in 2 from the total input targets in 1 to 
give the potential series of caps for the trading system  
4.  through discussion in the community, reassess feasibility of these caps 
and hence the original input targets and agree on a satisfactory cap. 
 
In addition to the goals stated above, the draft Action Plan sets the goal 
of reducing exports from farmland by 170 tN/y and total exports by 250 tN/y by 
2017. To achieve the export reductions off farmland a combination of improved 
farming practices and/or land-use changes will be used.. Depending on where 
these exports are reduced, this export reduction may go beyond the short term 
target of reducing inputs by 53 tN/y in 2005 and by 165 tN/y in 2055. If nitrogen 
exports are reduced on farms ‘close to the lake’ (in the sense that they are not in 
sub-catchments affected by large groundwater lags), then lake inputs will reduce 
quickly (~10–15 years) and lake water quality should improve quickly. On farms 
‘distant from the lake’ (where groundwater lags are very long), reductions in 
exports may not be reflected in reductions in lake inputs for many years.  
Decisions about the required reductions of inputs need to be translated 
into caps by defining what the reductions are relative to. Ultimately, the 
reductions need to be translated into caps on the sum of exports from the 12 
combinations of groundwater zones and time periods that affect the lake at a 
specific point in time. 
Table 2 shows a rough calculation in which incremental reductions in 
exports of tN/y are assumed and the reductions in lake inputs are shown over time. 








Incremental input reduction 
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     15  15 
40 
            
Cumulative  export  reduction  103 193 193 248 248 248 
Cumulative input reduction  53  53  168  193  208  248 
Goal—exports  (Table  1)    191      
Goal—inputs (Table 1)  53    165  165  205  252 
These reductions imply that by 2070 we have reduced annual nutrient 
loss in the 0-year lag zone by 53 tN/y, in the 20-year lag zone by 80 tN/y, and in 
the 40-year lag zone by 115 tN/y. These reductions may not be practical, of course 
—it’s only an illustration. 
 Length  of  periods 
Currently, goals are set at 50-year intervals. They do not explicitly 
address the timing between the defined points. In a nutrient trading market, the 
input goals will need to be defined for the current year and then possibly for 
longer time intervals thereafter—but with the possibility of banking to allow more 
temporal flexibility.  
  Definition of groundwater zones 
Exports from each zone at each point in time will be related to a 
specific temporal input goal (or group of goals—see section 4.2). Each property 
could be associated with one specific groundwater lag (i.e., assume that all 
nutrients from that property reach the lake at the same time). Some very large 
properties might overlap zones, and we could consider separating them. However, 13 
this could create monitoring difficulties for management practices (because, for 
example, animals are counted at the property level but probably move between 
zones on the farm) even if it does not create difficulties for land use. It may be 
better to compromise by allocating each property to the zone where most of their 
nutrients flow. 
The question is: How many zones should we include, and how should 
they be defined? The advantage of having more zones is that the control over 
timing of impacts of nutrient loss is more accurate and hence the system will more 
efficiently control water quality at the times when this is most critical. One 
disadvantage of having too many zones is that our knowledge of groundwater lags 
is not perfect, meaning that gains from efficient targeting may be illusory.  
One possible number of zones is one. This is the solution chosen in 
Taupo, but we should not default to this without serious consideration of the value 
of having more. The catchment could be divided into sub-catchments with ‘short’ 
and ‘long’ groundwater lags. In another alternative, each of the eight major 
catchments could be ascribed a single ‘lag’, estimated from GNS Science data on 
groundwater age. GNS  Science is currently working to define groundwater 
catchment boundaries. 
4 Temporal  markets 
4.1 Translating  input  caps  into export caps by zone 
The nutrients in a lake are ‘uniformly distributed’ pollutants, in the 
sense that it does not matter where they come from, and are not significantly 
accumulative in the lake (lake residence is only 1–2 years). But the spatial 
distribution of current nutrient loss has large implications for water quality at 
different times in the future because of the groundwater lags. Analogous to the 
spatial zones that are used in markets where the location of pollution matters (e.g., 
the Los Angeles air pollutant market, Los Angeles Regional Clean Air Incentives 
Market or RECLAIM), we could create a series of temporal markets where 
different locations would contribute to different input goals depending on the 
groundwater zone they were located in. Each goal would be associated with one 14 
market. Having a series of temporal markets would allow us to achieve the cost-
effective allocation of allowances. (See Appendix 2 for the theoretical proof.)  
For example, if there were two groundwater zones, 0-year lag (instant—
like a point source) and 1 year lag, we would need at least two markets to operate 
in 2007: one for inputs entering the lake in 2007 and another for 2008 inputs. In 
these markets, landowners would surrender allowances to match their net exports. 
Each market would have a cap, CAP2007 for the 2007 market and CAP2008 for the 
2008 market, with corresponding allowances of ‘vintages’ A2007 and A2008. Each 
allowances from each vintage could be used to match exports that affected inputs 
in the stated year. Landowners would own allowances from each future vintage 
that they would need. Their ownership would be recorded in a registry. In 2007, 
the landowners in the ‘instant’ zone would need to surrender A2007 allowances to 
match their net exports; in 2008, they would surrender A2008  allowances. In 
contrast, in 2007 landowners in the 1-year lag zone would surrender A2008 
allowances to match their net exports because 2008 is when the impact of their 
exports would be felt; in 2008, they would surrender A2009 allowances.  
The difference between spatial and temporal markets is that space does 
not move but time does. If we had a market for each future year, as above, the 
allowances surrendered to each market would simply sum over time as the 
markets stepped forward. In 2008, the A2008 allowances already surrendered to 
cover nutrient loss in 2007 would be excluded automatically from the remaining 
CAP2008 because they would be removed from the registry when they were 
surrendered. 
Allowance trading could occur within groundwater lag zones because 
all will use the same vintage allowances for exports in a given year. Trading could 
also occur between groundwater lag zones as long as the vintage of allowances 
bought and sold is the same. Trading between groundwater lag zones will change 
the timing of exports but not the timing of inputs. 
 15 
Table 3 Illustration of how impacts (and hence allowances) sum over periods to equal the 
cap 
Exports by groundwater zone (spatial)   
Instant   1-year lag 
Sum of impacts 
2007 impact  100 n.a.  Cap2007 = 100 
2008 impact  75 (from 2008 exports) +  75  (from  2007  exports)  
= 
Cap2008 = 150 
 
4.2 Combining  markets 
Creating one market per future year would create up to 200 markets for 
Rotorua, which would probably make markets too thin at any point in time. In 
addition, the definition of groundwater lags, especially for the longer lags, is not 
exact, so this may imply spurious accuracy.  
Instead of having one market per year, for periods further away, 
markets could be combined temporarily in ‘pools’ where groundwater lags are 
long. We would still have allowances, with vintages for each of the 200 years, 
A2007 to A2207. The second market could, for example, cover exports that reach the 
lake with 1–3 years of lag, the ‘+1–3 pool’. Landowners in groundwater zones 
with 1–3 years of lag could surrender any of the allowances in that pool to match 
their current exports. In 2007, this pool would cover inputs that would reach the 
lake in 2008–10. 
Each year, the exact vintages in the +1–3 pool would change. New ones 
would enter from the older vintage pools, and the remaining allowances with the 
current year vintage would leave that pool and go into the current pool. In 2008, 
the +1–3 pool would include 2009–11 vintages. 
5 Summary—preliminary  decisions 
•  We will proceed with our analysis on the assumption that N and P are 
included in trading. The final decision can be made later.  
•  We cannot define caps on inputs for the trading programme until flows 
of nutrients already in the groundwater that will reach the lake in each 
year are estimated by current GNS Science research. The Rotorua 
community may not wish to directly translate their currently defined 
input goals into short term binding targets for a trading regime if the 16 
reductions required are seen to be unreasonably expensive in the short 
term.  
•  We will be able to define spatial zones based on groundwater lags when 
current GNS Science research is complete. At that point, we will need 
to decide how, and whether, to combine for trading purposes the zones 
they identify. 
To close, we offer an illustration of what temporal trading would mean 
for a landowner. His property would at the start of the programme be assigned to a 
specific groundwater lag zone. This would not change. It would define which 
vintages of allowances he must surrender to match each year’s exports. 
Thus a property with a 2-year groundwater lag would need to hold 2012 
vintage input allowances to match 2010 exports. The landowner would (probably) 
be allocated some allowances relating to each of the future markets in which he 
would participate for a number of years into the future. If his exports in 2010 
exceeded his level of 2012 allowances, he would need to buy more allowances 
from other landowners. If his 2010 exports were lower than his level of 2012 
allowances, he could sell the excess allowances.  
If he could anticipate his exports several years in advance, he could also 
buy or sell allowances several years in advance. If he made an investment this 
year that lowered his nutrient exports in every future year by 1 tonne, he would 
need fewer allowances in all future periods and could sell his excess holdings of 
future allowance vintages.  
These temporal markets are conceptually complex but achieve the input 
targets with the greatest possible flexibility. Each landowner needs only to know 
which vintages of allowances match his exports in each year and how to 
monitor/model his net nutrient losses.  
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6 References 
Burns, N.M., Rutherford, J.C., Clayton, J.S. (1999) A monitoring and 
classification system for New Zealand lakes and reservoirs. Journal of 
Lakes and Reservoirs Management 15(4): 255–271. 
Environment Bay of Plenty (2004) A Statement of the Significance of Phosphorus 
and Nitrogen in the Management of Lakes Rotorua/Rotoiti. Technical 
Advisory Group. January 2004.  
Environment Bay of Plenty (2007) A Statement of the Significance of Phosphorus 
and Nitrogen in the Management of Lakes Rotorua/Rotoiti. Technical 
Advisory Group. Updated April 2007. 
Joint Strategy Committee (2007) Lakes Rotorua & Rotoiti Action Plan: A 
programme of adaptive management for the long-term protection and 
restoration of Lakes Rotorua and Rotoiti. Draft 2.5 March. 
Kerr, S., Lauder, G., Fairman, D. (2007) Towards Design for a Nutrient Trading 
Programme to Improve Water Quality in Lake Rotorua. Motu Working 
Paper 07–03. 
Lock, Kelly and Suzi Kerr (2007) Nutrient Trading in Lake Rotorua: Where are 
we now?  Background paper for Nutrient Trading Study Group. Motu 
Working Paper 07–06. 
Morgenstern, U., Gordon, D. (2004) Prediction of Future Nitrogen Loading to 
Lake Rotorua. GNS Science Consultancy Report 2006/10. 
Rutherford, J.C., Pridmore, R.D., White, E. (1989) Management of phosphorus 
and nitrogen inputs to Lake Rotorua, New Zealand. Journal of Water 
Resources Planning & Management 115(4): 431–439. 
Rutherford, J.C. (2003) Lake Rotorua nutrient load targets. NIWA Client Report 
HAM2003-155, Project BOP04220. October 2003. 58 pp. 
Tietenberg, Tom H (1985)  Emissions Trading Resources for the Future, 
Washington DC. 
Weitzman, M.L. (1974) Prices vs. Quantities. Review of Economics Studies 41. 
477–491. 18 
Appendix 1 
Table 4   Lake Rotorua’s nutrient inputs versus targets (summarises the calculation 
of the nitrogen and phosphorus reduction target needed for Lake Rotorua to attain its target 
TLI) 
Description  Nitrogen (t/y)  Phosphorus (t/y) 





Nutrient inputs to the lake itself, 
measured from 2002–05 inflows 
into Lake Rotorua 
2005: 547 
2055: 659 




Nutrients that cycle from the 
sediment–water interface into the 
lake 
360 
(up to 10 times 
per year) 
36 
(up to 10 times 
per year) 
Estimated ‘sustainable’ nutrient 













10 catchment, 25 
in-lake cycling 
Nutrient reduction targets  By 2017: 250 
By 2050: 311 
By 2017: 35 
The ‘nutrient reduction targets’ (last row above) are higher than the ‘estimated total nutrient 
reduction needed’ (second-to-last row) for Lake Rotorua. This is because the nutrient-enriched 
state of Lake Rotorua will take many decades to begin to restabilise at its long-term water-quality 
goal, unless the total nutrient reduction needed is reached earlier.  
Source: Lakes Rotorua and Rotoiti Action Plan Draft 2.5, March 2007, p. 51 
 
 
                                                             
6 This is the steady-state loading if nutrient loss from the catchment remains the same as in 2005.  
7 This calculation was made as part of the resource consent for the Rotorua Wastewater Treatment Plant. 19 
Table 5   Nutrient reduction actions for Lake Rotorua and Lake Rotoiti 
Cost ($)    Action  N reduction 
(t/y) 
P reduction 




Treatment Plant upgrade 
15 0  $1,484,320  $99  (N)  By  2006 
Community wastewater 
reticulation or OSET upgrade 
for Rotorua 
10.84 0.25  $4,990,637  $460  (N) 
max 
By 2014 
Storm-water upgrades within 
Rotorua urban 
3 0.5  $1,046,080  $348  (N) 
$2,092 (P) 
By 2017 
Tikitere geothermal   30  0  $108,200  $4 (N)

































{Phosphorus flocculation in 
the Utuhina Stream} 
{0}
9 {3}  $420,000  $140  (P)  By  2006 
{Phosphorus flocculation in 
two other streams} 
{0} {6}  $840,000  $140  (P)  ~ 
Constructed wetlands 
 
N reductions, costs, and time frames will depend on the site and proposal. 
Further evaluation is required. 
In-lake/in-stream nutrient 
removal using biomass 
N reductions, costs, and time frames will depend on the site and proposal. 
Further evaluation is required. 
Lake-bed sediment treatment   0

































Hamurana Stream diversion 










  Land-use management and 
land-use change 




Total Lake Rotorua  228.84  
(+ Hamurana) 
15.75 (inc flocculants) 
+ 25 (lake-bed treatment) 
+ 6.3 (Hamurana) 
  
Ohau Channel diversion to 
Kaituna River 




Land use diverted by Ohau 
Channel diversion 
6 0.07 ~ ~  ~ 
Community waste-water 
reticulation or OSET upgrade 
for Rotoiti 









































0 0  By  2017 
Lake Rotoiti: proposed action   Treatment of Lake Rotoiti’s lake-bed sediments. Further evaluation is required once the 
effect of the Ohau Channel diversion has been assessed in the 6-year review. 
Total Lake Rotoiti  161.94  15.28      
Source: Lakes Rotorua and Rotoiti Action Plan Draft 2.5, March 2007, p. 17 
                                                             
8 This cost per kg N is lower than other actions because the Tikitere geothermal flow has a high nitrogen 
concentration and low volume and is close to existing reticulation infrastructure. 
9 {#} means that the action is only temporary until long-term land use change/management actions can take 
effect. 
10 Lake-bed sediment treatment will reduce N releases. However, these reductions are not calculated towards 
the N reduction target as sediment N releases are excluded (see sections [5] and [9.10] in Action Plan). 
11 The ‘true’ N and P reduction for Lake Rotorua is expected to be lower than this. A Hamurana diversion 
would increase the lake water residence time and decrease oxygenation of bottom waters, thereby increasing 
the influence of other nutrient sources on in-lake nutrient concentration. The actual impact of a Hamurana 
diversion on Lake Rotorua’s water quality needs a full assessment. 
12 This load is expected to increase to 92 tonnes N/year in 50 years’ time, and 118 tonnes at ‘steady state’ (> 
year 2200).  
13 Presuming mid-range capital cost = $25 million, maintenance costs $30,000 per year, 50 year lifespan. 
14 $6 per kg N is simply a budgeted average for expected costs over 10 years. The nutrient reductions from 
land use/land-use management changes will continue beyond 10 years, but total costs will be capped at $10 
million.  20 
 
Table 6   Lake Rotorua’s nutrient inflows using land-use nutrient export coefficients 
 
Plus lake-bed sediment releases: About 360 tonnes N and 36 tonnes P can be recycled 
into the water column from the lake bed up to 10 times per year.  
 
 










Sewerage 28.0  55.9  1.00  26.2 
Septic tanks  12.0  23.9  0.53  13.9 
Storm water  10.1  20.2  2.29  59.9 
Total  50.1 100  3.82 100 
Note: These figures are not time bound. They reflect steady-state loading rather than 
lower nutrient loads now that gradually increase to steady state over time. 
Source: Lakes Rotorua and Rotoiti Action Plan Draft 2.5, March 2007, p. 49 
 
                                                             
15 The nutrient inputs resulting from waterfowl grazing will vary considerably from year to year as numbers 
of birds in the Lakes Rotorua and Rotoiti catchments fluctuate. In terms of ‘strict’ nutrient budgeting, most of 
the nutrient inputs are termed ‘recycling’ when the waterfowl eat lake plants. The waterfowl figures are 
included in this table for comparison only and are not included in the total tonnages or percentages.   
16 Rounded to 1 decimal point. Actual coefficient = 3.6155. 


















10,588  4 42.1  5.4  0.12  1.31  3.3 
Exotic forest  9,463  3  28.4  3.6  0.10  0.95  2.4 
Cropping and 
horticulture 
282 60 16.9  2.2  2.00  0.56  1.4 
Pasture [p] 20,112  See  table 
below 
563.0 71.9  0.84  16.93  42.5 
Lifestyle 556  20  11.1  1.4  0.90  0.50  1.3 
Urban [u] 3,267  See  table 
below 
50.1 6.4  1.17  3.82  9.6 
Springs           13.00  32.7 
Geothermal     42.2  5.4    1.40  3.5 
Waterfowl
15     1.4  0.2    0.80  2.0 
Rain 8,079.0  3.6


























Beef 1,196  35  41.9  7.4  0.9  1.08  6.4 
Sheep 28  16  0.5  0.1  1.0  0.03  0.2 
Sheep and beef  10,240  18  184.3  32.7  0.9  9.22  54.4 
Deer 418  15  6.3  1.1  0.9  0.38  2.2 
Deer/sheep/beef 1,294  18 23.3  4.1  0.9  1.16  6.8 
Dairy 5,883  50  294.1  52.2  0.7  4.12  24.3 
Grassland 425  12  5.1  0.9  0.9  0.38  2.2 
Other 628  12  7.5  1.3  0.9  0.57  3.4 
Total 20,112  28  563.0  100  0.8  16.93  100 21 
Appendix 2 
The following formal derivation of an optimal nutrient trading system 
with attenuation and groundwater lags draws heavily on Tietenberg (1985). 
Nutrient input targets have been defined for the Lake Rotorua 
catchment. These targets, if not exceeded, will allow the water quality goals 
defined by Environment Bay of Plenty (EBOP) to be achieved because the lake 
residence time is only 1–2 years. Thus the nutrients can be considered to be 
‘assimilative’ rather than ‘accumulative’. Nutrients are considered to be uniformly 
mixed within the lake. However, the nutrients are not a standard mixed 
assimilative pollutant because we can monitor nutrient loss, or exports, from 
properties but want to control nutrient input to the lake each year.  
The level of nutrients entering the lake, or inputs, from a particular 
property may be lower than the level of exports due to attenuation. Thus the level 
of nutrients reaching the lake depends on where in the catchment the nutrients are 
lost from, introducing a spatial component to the system.  
Because of groundwater lags, in some areas of the catchment, it can 
take up to 200 years for the nutrients lost from a property to reach the lake. Thus 
the exports and inputs are unlikely to be equal in a given year. This time lag 
between nutrients leaving the property and reaching the lake introduces a temporal 
component to the system.  
6.1 Cost-effective  allocation 
The environmental quality–nutrient loss relationship for an assimilative 
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J
j
s j j j j x r e d a A                  (1) 
where  A is the level of lake inputs, a is the nutrient input from 
unmanageable sources and sources not in the nutrient trading system, dj is the 
attenuation associated with property j, J is the total number of properties in the 
nutrient trading system, and  j e  is the nutrient loss from property j if there were no 22 
controls on nutrient loss. rj is the reduction in nutrient export from property j. 
These reductions may result from changes in nutrient loss from the property up to 
200 years before the inputs enter the lake—the lag depends on the groundwater 
lag associated with the property. There will be a lag, s, between the economic 
activity, which reduces nutrient loss (which when the costs are incurred) and the 
time when the lake inputs fall. (S is the maximum lag between the economic 
activity that reduces inputs and when the inputs reach the lake). The cost of this 
economic activity at time –s on property j is represented by xj,-s.  
Let  Cj(rj(xj,-s) be the continuous cost function, which represents the 
minimum cost to the property of achieving any level of nutrient loss reduction. 
Generally, as rj(xj,-s) increases, the marginal cost of achieving additional 
reductions will increase. Thus we can write the cost-effective allocation of 
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where  ρ  is the discounted rate. Solving this maximisation problem through the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions gives us the following: 
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When some control is being exercised, rj(xj,-s) i s  e x p e c t e d  t o  b e  
positive, implying that nutrient input reductions are made. The cost of achieving 
these reductions in exports will be equated across sources, with an adjustment 
made for the level of attenuation between properties. This can be seen below. 
From equation (3), for property j, the cost of reducing nutrients is 
equated over time, adjusted by a discounted rate. 
j s
j
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For another property, k, the same equation can be developed. 
k s
k
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By combining equations (10) and (11), we can see that the marginal 
cost of reducing exports is equated across sources, with an adjustment for the 
level of attenuation. Thus the marginal cost of achieving reductions in lake inputs 
is equated across sources in a cost-effective allocation. 
k k
s k k k
j j
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The cost of reducing nutrient exports is likely to be positive. Thus we 
expect equation (5) to be binding when some control is being exercised. Thus in a 
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λ      (13) 
Thus the marginal costs of the economic activities undertaken to reduce 
nutrient exports on property j rise over time at rate ρ . The discounted costs of 
these activities are equated across all s. 
We expect that λ will be positive for Lake Rotorua catchment because 
the current nutrient export and input levels are greater than the maximum level 
that would allow water quality goals to be achieved. Thus we expect equation (7) 
to always be binding so that the level of nutrients entering the lake equals  A. 
6.2 Nutrient  trading  system 
To implement a nutrient trading system in this catchment, allowances 
need to be created such that the permissible level of nutrient loss from the 
allowances, N, equals the trading cap,  a A− . Allowances are created for ‘vintage’ 
markets. Each source must hold allowances for the vintage market corresponding 
to the year that their exports impact on the lake.  
Once allowances are issued, they will command a positive price if 
introduction of the system corresponds to a reduction in nutrient loss. Each 
property should attempt to acquire the number of allowances that will minimise 25 
their total cost. Suppose that each source has an initial allowance endowment,  j n , 
which allows 
0








, allow  A tonnes of nutrient loss. Faced with this control, each 
property is faced with the problem below: 
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where Ps is the forward price of acquiring an additional allowance or 
the price received for selling an allowance. So the price for an allowance 
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. Solving this optimisation gives the following: 
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         J j ,..., 1 =  26 
         S s ,..., 1 =  
0 ≥ j r         J j ,..., 1 =             (19) 
Combining equations (3) and (15), when there is control on the exports, 
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λ . Thus the 
allocation will be cost effective when the discounted price of an allowance equals 
the value to the catchment of allowing an additional unit of nutrients to enter the 
lake at time –s.  27 
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